Abstract-Users receive a multitude of digital-and physicalsecurity advice every day. Indeed, if we implemented all the security advice we received, we would never leave our houses or use the Internet. Instead, users selectively choose some advice to accept and some (most) to reject; however, it is unclear whether they are effectively prioritizing what is most important or most useful. If we can understand from where and why users take security advice, we can develop more effective security interventions.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) list of advice for home computer users there are 61 topics, with approximately 500 words of advice per topic [1] . This single US-CERT page contains more than 30,000 words of digital-security advice. If people listened to all of the security advice that must be contained in the multitude of digital-and physical-security advice sources available today, they would never leave their houses or use the Internet again. Since people are still leaving their houses, and most certainly still using the Internet, how are they determining which security advice to implement and which to discard? It is important to understand how users learn security behaviors in order to ensure that the best or most important security tactics can break through the noise and attract adoption.
Previous research related to users' security behaviors has primarily focused on identifying those behaviors and experimenting with how to change them [2] , [3] . Other work has shown the important influence of social factors on security behavior [4] , [5] . Additional work has proposed that users choose which behaviors to practice based on an analysis of the costs and benefits [6] , [7] .
Despite this past work, there has been no comprehensive analysis of why users choose to accept and reject digitalsecurity advice and from what sources they take this advice. Nor has there been a direct comparison between the advicetaking behaviors of users in the more well-established domain of physical security with the more recent area of digital security. As a first step toward establishing a deeper understanding of users' approaches to learning digital-security behaviors, we sought to answer the following research questions: Q1) Where or from whom do users learn digital-and physical-security behaviors? Q2) How do users' advice sources, reasons for accepting or rejecting advice, and valuation of advice differ for digital and physical security? Q3) How do demographics, as well as exposure to securitysensitive content and workplace trainings, impact the use of different advice sources or users' reasons for accepting or rejecting advice?
To address these questions, we conducted a semi-structured interview study with 25 participants of varied demographics. During a 60-minute interview, we asked questions designed to help participants articulate their digital-security habits at home, as well as where they learned these strategies and why they chose to implement them, with the assumption that participants could in most cases accurately recall their habits and articulate reasons for those habits. We also addressed where participants learned security strategies and why they may reject certain strategies that they have heard about but choose not employ. We explicitly compared this information to the ways that participants learn and process physical-security advice, to determine whether mechanisms that inform physical-security advice-taking can be imported to the digital domain.
Further, we recruited participants in two groups: securitysensitive users who handle data governed by a security clearance or by HIPAA or FERPA regulations, and general users who do not. This allowed us to consider the effect that regular exposure to a data-security mindset has on the ways that users process security advice in their personal (non-work) lives. Finally, we explored as a case study participants' reactions to two-factor authentication, which has been identified as a highly effective but underutilized security tool [8] .
We rigorously analyzed this interview data using an iterative open-coding process. We identified several interesting findings, including:
• Participants evaluate digital-security advice based primarily on the trustworthiness of the advice source. This contrasts sharply with physical security, where the trustworthiness of the source is less important because users feel comfortable independently evaluating the content and value of the advice.
• Prior work has identified negative personal experience as a learning tool [3] ; we find that TV shows and movies that present negative-security events with relatable characters and clearly defined causes can also be strong motivators for adopting new security behaviors.
• Participants have many more reasons for rejecting both digital-and physical-security advice than for accepting it. For digital security in particular, these reasons include not just the obvious-that advice is too complicated or that the participant is oversaturated-but also more subtle rationales, such as the presence of too much marketing and concerns about privacy.
Based on these and other trends extracted from our interviews, we distill recommendations for designing and disseminating more effective security advice. These recommendations include highlighting information to mitigate user privacy concerns for services such as two-factor authentication; increasing the credibility of security advice by removing product-specific references to reduce users' impressions of the advice as marketing material; and replacing corporate security training videos with more relatable fictional vignettes illustrating negative events. We believe these guidelines can help security experts to magnify the impact of truly important security advice.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss prior research in four related areas: examining the factors that influence users' security behaviors, determining which security behaviors or recommendations are valuable, theoretical frameworks for analyzing technology adoption, and developing or evaluating security interventions.
A. Factors Influencing Security Behaviors
Several researchers have examined how specific factors influence security behaviors. Das et al. demonstrated the importance of social influence; for example, showing users information about their Facebook friends' security behaviors made them more likely to adopt the same behaviors [2] , [9] . Relatedly, Rader et al. found that security stories from nonexpert peers affect how users think about computer security and how they make security decisions like whether to click on a link [3] . Wash identified "folk models" of security, such as viewing hackers like digital graffiti artists, that influence users' perceptions of what is and is not dangerous [10] . Lastly, Rader and Wash together examined how the topics and words used in three types of security advice may affect user's ability to make good security decisions [11] . Our work broadens these findings by explicitly considering a variety of ways, social and otherwise, in which users may learn about different security behaviors.
Security decisions are often framed as economic tradeoffs, in which users ignore security best practices due to rational cost-benefit optimization. Herley, for example, suggests that if users were to spend one minute of each day checking URLs to avoid phishing, the time cost would be much larger than the cost of the phishing itself [6] . To investigate whether users are in fact making rational cost-benefit calculations, we examine users' reported thought processes when accepting and rejecting security advice. Further, researchers have considered a compliance budget: the limited time and resources users can spend on security behavior [7] , [12] . This highlights the importance of understanding how users decide which advice they spend their compliance budget on, so that the most valuable advice can be designed to rise to the top. Although this prior work also focuses on why users implement or reject security behaviors, our work differs in a few key ways: our study is about home security behaviors, whereas Beautement et al. addressed only the organizational environment [7] ; relatedly, our study draws from a larger and more diverse participant pool; and finally, we investigate not only why users reject security behaviors but also why they accept or reject advice from a multitude of sources.
Other researchers have considered how demographics affect security and privacy decision-making. Howe et al. note that socioeconomic status, and the corresponding belief that one's information may not be "important enough to hack," can affect security behaviors [5] . This paper also notes large differences in advice sources between undergraduate and adult populations. Wash and Rader investigated security beliefs and behaviors among a large, representative U.S. sample and found that more educated users tended to have more sophisticated beliefs but take fewer precautions [13] . Others have investigated how demographic and personality factors influence susceptibility to phishing [14] , [15] . Rainie et al. found that younger people, social media users, and those who had a prior bad experience were more likely to try to hide their online behavior [4] . Based on this prior work, we recruited specifically for diversity of age, income, education, and race. Further, we recruited for and analyzed the impact of an additional type of diversity: security sensitivity, meaning professional training to handle confidential or sensitive data. In addition, during our data analysis, we coded for participants who discussed whether their information was important to protect and whether they had prior negative experiences.
Although prior work touches on similar themes, to our knowledge we are the first to comprehensively examine users' primary sources of digital security advice in general and why they choose to accept or reject it. Further, our work directly compares digital security to physical security. By drawing lessons from each domain, we develop design guidelines for effectively transmitting security information.
B. Expert Advice and Best Practices
Any attempt to improve the dissemination and adoption of security advice will of course require decisions about which advice is relevant and important. In recent work, Ion et al. surveyed more than 200 security experts to determine what behaviors they most often practice and/or strongly recommend [8] . Top suggestions included installing software updates, using two-factor authentication, and using a password manager. Corporate and government help pages from organizations such as Microsoft, the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team, and McAfee also provide users with pieces of top advice, including tips for improving the strength of passwords and encouragement to update software regularly [1] , [16] , [17] . These best practices provide insight into what advice is most valuable to give users; in this paper, we address the related but orthogonal problem of how users receive and respond to advice, and therefore how important advice can be disseminated when it is identified.
C. Theoretical Frameworks
A sizable body of research focuses on theoretical frameworks to explain technological adoption. One such theory, Diffusion of Innovation, emphasizes how communication channels and social systems can lead to the introduction of new innovations into communities over time [18] . Applications of this theory often require large samples and longitudinal data [19] . In contrast, Digital Divide theory suggests that access inequality is the most important factor in technology adoption [20] . The application of Digital Divide theory also requires longitudinal data in combination with socioeconomic information to evaluate technological progress. In this smallsample, qualitative work, we take a theory-agnostic approach to data analysis. Follow-up research could be used to establish how our findings fit within these frameworks.
D. User Education and Security Interventions
Another large body of work is devoted to analyzing and improving delivery of security information to users, particularly in the context of user education and designing security warnings. For example, significant research has examined how to educate users about phishing prevention [21] - [25] . There has also been considerable work addressing the effectiveness of phishing and SSL warnings for browsers [26] - [29] , banking security warnings [30] , and security-warning habituation generally [31] . Other researchers have considered how best to nudge users to create stronger passwords [32] - [35] and how to inform them about potentially invasive mobile app permissions [36] - [39] . Our work takes an alternate view: rather than focus on how to promote adoption of one specific security behavior, we consider why users make the security decisions they do, where they get their educational materials, and how they evaluate credibility.
III. METHODOLOGY
To answer our research questions, we conducted semistructured interviews in our laboratory between March and October 2015. To support generalizable and rigorous qualitative results, we conducted interviews until new themes stopped emerging (25 participants) [40] . Our subject pool is larger than the 12-20 interviews suggested by qualitative bestpractices literature; as such, it can provide a strong basis for both future quantitative work and generalizable design recommendations [41] .
The study was approved by the University of Maryland Institutional Review Board. Below, we discuss our recruitment process, interview procedure, details of our qualitative analysis, and limitations of our work.
A. Recruitment
We recruited participants from the Washington D.C. metro area via Craiglist postings and by sending emails to neighborhood listservs. We also distributed emails in public-and private-sector organizations with the help of known contacts in those organizations. In addition, we posted flyers in University of Maryland buildings and emailed university staff members. We collected demographic information including age, gender, income, job role, zip code, and education level from respondents in order to ensure a broad diversity of participants. Participants were compensated $25 for an approximately onehour interview session.
B. Procedure
We asked participants to bring a device they use to connect to the Internet for personal use with them to their interview. Two researchers conducted all of the interviews, which took between 40 and 70 minutes. We used a semi-structured interview protocol, in which the interviewer primarily uses a standard list of questions but has discretion to ask follow-ups or skip questions that have already been covered [42] . Semistructured interviews allow researchers to gather information about participants' practices, habits, and experiences as well as their opinions and attitudes.
During the interview, we asked questions about participants' digital-and physical-security habits as well as where they learned those habits (Q1, Q2). We also asked participants to "act out" their use of technology in a series of scenarios. We asked questions about participants' behaviors and advice sources for digital-security topics such as device security, including password protection and antivirus use; web browsing and emailing, including two-factor authentication and phishing questions; and online banking and shopping, including questions about the participant's banking login process and payment methods (Q1, Q2). We asked similar questions regarding physical-security topics such as dwelling security, including questions about locking methods and alarm systems; transit (e.g. car and bike) security, with questions similar to those asked for dwelling security; and personal safety when walking alone, including questions about carrying weapons (Q1, Q2). We validated that our list of digital security topics broadly covered the same topics as those mentioned as high priority in Ion et al.'s recent paper [8] .
On each of these topics, participants were first asked a general open-ended question regarding their security behaviors: for example, "How do you protect your devices?" and then asked sequentially more specific questions, for example: "Can you show me how you access the home screen on your smartphone?", "Have you always had/not had a password on your smartphone?", and "Are there other strategies you use for protecting your devices which you have not mentioned?"
Participants were subsequently asked a series of followup questions on each topic, such as "Why do you use this strategy?" (Q2); "Have you ever had a negative experience with...?" (Q1); and "Where or from whom did you learn this strategy?" (Q1). In addition to questions regarding specific security topics, participants were asked more generally about where, from whom, and why they accepted security advice, as well as about strategies they had considered but not adopted (Q2). Participants were also asked to compare digital-and physical-security advice in terms of usefulness and trustworthiness (Q2). Finally, participants were asked to briefly describe their current or most recent job. They were specifically asked if they handled sensitive data as part of their job, and if so, what kind (Q3).
C. Analysis
The interview data was analyzed using an iterative opencoding process [43] . Once the two interviewers completed the interviews, they transcribed 17 of the interviews. The remaining eight interviews were transcribed by an external transcription service. The interviewers then met in person to develop and iteratively update an initial set of codes for the data. Subsequently, they independently coded each interview, incrementally updating the codebook as necessary and re-coding previously coded interviews. This process was repeated until all interviews were coded. The codes of the two interviewers were then compared by computing the inter-coder percent agreement using the ReCal2 software package [44] . The inter-coder percent agreement for this study is 75%. This is a reasonable score for an exploratory semi-structured study, with a large number of codes, such as ours [45] . Further, after calculating this percent agreement score, the interviewers met to iterate on the codes until they reached 100% agreement on the final codes for each interview.
D. Signifying Prevalence
For each finding, we state the number of participants who expressed this sentiment, as an indication of prevalence. However, our results are not quantitative, and a participant failing to mention a particular item for which we coded does not imply they disagree with that code; rather the participant may have simply failed to mention it. As a result, we opted not to use statistical hypothesis tests for comparisons among participants. Our results are not necessarily statistically generalizable beyond our sample; however, they suggest many areas for future work and provide novel contributions to the body of work surrounding users' strategies for learning digital-security behaviors.
E. Limitations
Our study has several limitations common to qualitative research. While we asked participants to search their memory for answers to our questions, they may not have fully done so, or they may have forgotten some information. Further, we assume that participants are largely able to correctly identify which of their behaviors are security behaviors and why they practiced those behaviors. To mitigate satisficing [46] , interviewers repeatedly prompted participants to give full answers to all questions. Participants may also have tired and provided less thorough answers toward the end of the interview, and those who were particularly concerned about the interviewer's perception of them may have altered their answers in order to not portray themselves as overly secure or insecure [46] , [47] . Additionally, the age, gender and race of the interviewers may have introduced some bias into participants' responses. We recruited a diverse pool of participants to increase the odds that relevant ideas would be mentioned by at least one participant, despite these limitations.
IV. RESULTS
In this section we detail the results of our study. First, we will discuss our participants' demographics and security sensitivity. An overview of these demographics is shown in Table I . Second, we will address the sources from which participants accept security advice and how these sources differ across genders and for physical and digital security. A summary of these sources is shown in Figure 1 . Third, we will address the different reasons our participants gave for accepting and rejecting digital-and physical-security advice; some of the differences in these reasons were unanticipated. Fourth, we address differences between security-sensitive and general participants, which imply imply that exposure to digital-security information in the workplace may have effects on advice processing. Finally, we present a case study on twofactor authentication, a behavior found by Ion et al. to have high security importance, but low adoption [8] .
A. Participants
We recruited 158 potential participants and selected 47 to interview. We selected a balance of men and women, as well as a diversity of age, ethnicity, and education. Of the 47 participants selected for interviews, 25 attended their interview appointments.
Demographics for our 25 participants are shown in Table I . Fifty-six percent of our participants are female, slightly more female than the general U.S. population in 2014 (51%) [48] . Our sample is somewhat less Hispanic (8% vs. 17%) and less White (40% vs. 62%), but more Black (44% vs. 13%) than the U.S. population [48] . We had a proportional number of Asian participants (8%). However, the racial makeup of our sample more closely matched the racial proportions of the Washington D.C. metro area, which is 43% White (our sample: 40%), 46% Black (our sample: 44%), 10% Hispanic (our sample: 8%) and 4% Asian (our sample: 8%) [49] . Our participant sample is wealthier than the US population and our demographic area: 28% of our participants have a household income under $50,000, whereas 47% of households in the general US population and 40.1% of households in the D.C. area earn less than $50,000 per year [49] , [50] . Our sample is, however, representative of the educational attainment in our demographic area: 88% of our participants hold a high school degree or higher, compared with 90.1% per the D.C. area census; and 60% of our participants hold a Bachelor's degree or higher, compared to 55% in the D.C. area [49] .
B. How Security Behaviors Are Learned
Participants reported implementing digital-and physicalsecurity advice from a number of sources. While many sources were common to both digital and physical security (media, peers, family), in this section we emphasize advice sources unique to digital security, including IT professionals, the workplace, and providers of participants' digital services (e.g. Comcast). Next, we discuss a new source of security information: fictional portrayals of negative-security events through TV shows and movies. Our findings emphasize and expand prior findings on the importance of negative security stories for teaching digital security behaviors [3] . We then consider common sources -media, family members, and peers -in more detail. We examine which specific people and sources in this group our participants considered authoritative. Finally, we include an interpretive section discussing genderbased differences in advice sources.
Digital Only: IT Professionals. IT professionals are an information source strictly for digital-security methods (N=12). These professionals can be colleagues in a participant's work environment or friends of the participant. As we will discuss in Section IV-C, a participant's belief that a digital-security advice source is trustworthy is a primary factor in whether they choose to accept the advice; it seems that participants view IT professionals as especially trustworthy. "For personal [digital security advice], I might talk to one of the IT guys about that. I just talk to . . . the one I'm most friends with, I always try to get information: what's the best intervention, what do you think?" comments P15. Further, participants may use IT professionals to evaluate the trustworthiness of advice they have seen elsewhere. For example, P19 says that when she is looking for new digital-security advice, she will "talk to the IT guy at my office. I've talked to him a couple of times about my phone and whatever I hear or read." Although participants may receive useful advice from colleagues and friends who are IT professionals, we hypothesize that this advice may not be sufficient. For example, as P13 notes: "My friends who work in IT, they just tell you to change your password as often as possible."
Digital Only: Workplace. In addition to information users solicit from IT professionals, users also receive unsolicited security advice from their workplaces in the form of newsletters, IT emails, or required trainings. Fourteen participants cited receiving this type of advice. P4 says, for example, that she learned from work not to click links in emails that claim she needs to update her password. "We got an email from IT telling us that, never will there'll be an email from them that would require you to do that." Similarly, P8 pays attention to her security trainings at work: "They'll do yearly IT security training, which is not even necessarily for work, but just for life . . . they talk about things like not sending people money over Facebook . . . they also email out updates when things change. I do actually pay attention to those emails when they send them, like about privacy notice updating." Further, P2 says she "always reads the IT newsletter" put out by her workplace.
Digital Only: Service Provider. Another source of digital security information cited by nine participants is the corporations that provide a service to the participant (e.g. SunTrust Bank, Apple, Verizon). For example, P23 comments: "I usually call my carrier (Comcast) and they have security stuff for your internet and they'll tell me what I can do."
Negative Experiences.
As reported in Rader and Wash's work on security stories, negative events described by peers or directly experienced by participants can be strong learning tools [3] . In our study, we found that 24 participants either had negative experiences themselves or were told stories of negative-security events by peers, which led to behavior changes. The distribution of the types of negative-security situations (events that happened to the participant, to the participant's friend, or that the participant heard about through TV) on which participants relied is shown in Figure 2 . Our participant sample was smaller, yet broader, than that used in Rader and Wash's work, and our results thus confirm the generalizability of their findings beyond the college student population [3] .
Participants tend not to learn from security stories told by others or from events that happen to themselves when they feel that they or the victim did all they could to prevent the event, when they feel that they or the victim placed themselves in harm's way, or when they cannot find a cause for the negative event. For example, P2 had a friend who was robbed, but did not change her own behavior "because I think she took all the precautions she reasonably could. She parked in a brightly lit area and a reasonably safe neighborhood...I don't think that there was much...[that she could] have changed." P24 and P9 have had friends who got viruses, but they did not do anything differently afterwards, because they felt that the friends were victimized due to their lack of technical expertise. Finally, P18 comments, "I actually think recently someone tried to log into my email from China and Google sent me an email and Google blocked it and said it looked strange and I said it was very strange," but he did not alter his behavior after this incident.
Although only four participants cited TV shows specifically, each strongly recalled stories of negative physical or digital security-related events happening to characters in those shows. They directly credited these shows with leading to a specific change in their behavior. For example, P12 put a password on his WiFi network after watching a tech show that showed "people going by houses and WiFi snooping and knocking on people's doors saying, 'Oh your WiFi is open, you need to protect it' . . . shows like that, [they] make you think." P14 had a similar experience: watching a movie motivated her to always check the back seats in her car for a lurking person. "People had mentioned that you should check your back seats before but I never paid attention to it until [this] movie," she says. Thus, it seems that TV shows or movies may serve as strong proxies for a negative experience that happens directly to the user or someone she knows. We hypothesize two reasons for this: (1) while participants often blamed themselves or their friends for personality or behavioral flaws that led to security problems, they were more likely to give relatable fictional characters or the unknown real victims shown on TV the benefit of the doubt; and (2) TV shows and movies are typically designed to be vivid, realistic, and believable, thus making participants feel that what is happening on the screen could happen to them, too.
Evaluating Authority in Common Advice Sources. Prior work has identified media, family, and peers as important sources of digital-security advice [2] . Our results confirm these findings, and offer additional insights into which media participants feel is most authoritative and how participants evaluate the expertise of their family and peers.
Almost all participants (N=24) reported receiving both digital-and physical-security information from media. Media included online articles, forums, television shows, news shows, the radio, magazines, and advertisements. Of the participants who cited media as an advice source for digital security, five participants cited a specific technology-oriented resource as authoritative or trustworthy: "Some of the blog[s] I read [are] by computer people, those are the most trustworthy. For example, I read Wired," says P20. In general, the technical sources cited by these participants were: CNet, Wired, Bruce Schneier's blog and Mashable. [51] - [54] .
Another common source of digital-and physical-security advice are family members (N=21) and peers (N=15). In describing why they chose to take security advice from their family members or friends, 11 participants said they consulted their peer or family member because they considered this person an expert. For example, P1 says he always asks his fatherin-law for digital security information because his father-inlaw is "a bit of a techie in his spare time. He's the one that I go to for advice and feedback, new stuff, articles, he'll send links. He knows the best of what's going on." Interestingly, however, expert status in our sample was not necessarily determined by education or job role (e.g. IT professional, police officer) but rather by participant's perceptions of the "tech-savviness" or physical-security expertise of their peer or family member.P3 says that he purchased anti-virus software at his father's direction. He says, he's "very tech-savvy and he'll say, 'You need to get this. This is important.' I don't question him because he's very much in the know." When asked what makes his father 'tech-savvy', P3 says "he's always loved computers and all that entails, but he doesn't work in technology." Further exploration of specific cues leveraged by users to assess the 'tech-savvy' or expertise of their friends, family, and the media could aid researchers in signaling advice-source trustworthiness, which is a primary motivator for users' acceptance of digital-security advice, as discussed further in IV-C.
Gender and Advice.
Eighteen participants, evenly split between men and women, cited a man as a source of digitalsecurity advice, while only three cited a woman. If this trend holds true among a larger population, it may be because men have historically been overrepresented in technology and computing fields and thus are considered to be more authoritative on that topic [55] . Alternatively, men may simply offer more unsolicited advice in the domain of digital security, or perhaps because women are still underrepresented in IT and computing fields there are fewer women who chose to offer digital-security advice [56] .
On the other hand, 12 participants cited a woman as a source of physical-security advice, compared to three participants who cited men. Eight of these 12 participants who received physical-security advice from women were women themselves. Historically, women have had higher rates of crime victimization, perceive themselves to be at higher risk of victimization, and express greater fear of crime than do men [57] . It is probable that women are aware of this gendered difference in threat levels and perceptions, and thus find each other more relatable sources of advice.
C. Why Advice is Accepted
What leads users to accept advice from the sources mentioned above? In this section, we discuss participants' reasons for accepting security advice. We find that the trustworthiness of the advice source is the key metric for digital security. This finding may be explained by another of our findings: participants struggle to assess the plausibility and value of digitalsecurity advice. In contrast, participants' relative confidence in their assessment of the plausibility of and necessity for physical-security advice leads them to cite their own evaluation of the advice's content as the primary assessment metric in the physical domain. We also in this section compare which advice, physical or digital, participants feel is more useful and/or more trustworthy.
Digital-Security Advice. Eleven participants used the trustworthiness of the advice source to determine whether to take digital-security advice.
In the case of media advice, participants must determine whether advice offered by an unknown author is trustworthy. Participants mentioned five heuristics that they use to measure the trustworthiness of a media advice source, including: their knowledge and trust of the advice author, other users' reviews of the advice, how widespread the advice was on various media outlets, whether the content of the advice differed strongly from their current behavior, and the simplicity of the advice. All of these heuristics were equally prevalent in our data.
The first technique mentioned for evaluating media advice source trustworthiness was to assess the author or media outlet providing the advice: P20 notes that her acceptance of advice, "depends on the author and how the article is written." P22 says he finds advice useful "If I would quote that source to someone else, like the Washington Post, [or another] reputable media outlet. If it's just some Matt Drudge on the Internet advising about computer security, I would just ignore that more quickly than I saw it."
A second evaluation metric was other users' reviews of the advice. Two security-sensitive participants, one who holds an M.S. in digital security (P24) and another who handled FERPA data as an HR file clerk (P10), crowd-sourced their advice and software evaluation. P24 comments, "I evaluate howto videos and other advice channels via user comments." Similarly, P10 says, "I look at reviews and the software and the website to decide whether to use the advice or download [software] . I look at whether it has a good reputation-whether it is popular with online reviewing."
A third heuristic for advice evaluation was how widespread across different media outlets the advice became, with the implicit assumption that distribution outlets who reprinted a given piece of advice had evaluated the sources and information and found it to be valid. P25 comments that he trusts "news that's backed up by facts and is across multiple channels, because if it's not good, multiple places won't pick it up."
A fourth metric for evaluating a media advice-source trustworthiness was how much the content of the advice differed from the participant's current behavior: P5 says she took the advice because "it was the opposite of what I was doing, so it automatically made it seem as though it was more credible." P2 comments that she took the advice since "it made sense; I guess if [my password is] a bit longer, it's harder for [a malicious] computer to figure it out." Finally, a fifth heuristic for media advice-source evaluation is the simplicity of the advice. P2 adds, "If it's just tips that you can implement in your everyday life, then the advice feels more trustworthy" and P16 wishes that advice "would have a better setup to say 'Here, this is what you have to do for step one, step two, step three.' . . . like from Google when they're saying that you can [add] privacy."
Participants may rely on the trustworthiness of the advice source because they are not confident in their own ability to evaluate the content of the advice. Indeed, P7 says, "physical security is related more to me and my body . . . it makes sense to me whereas with computer security, I'm securing myself from threats that I don't even know anything about...I know when somebody walks up with a gun that I should be worried." P12 also notes that the tangibility of physical security can make personal safety strategies more trustworthy and easier to implement, commenting, "you know, cyber security is great, but the people who are doing it are so smart that they can put back doors in it that you don't even know about, so sometimes, I don't even trust the advice...with physical security, I can touch that, or I know someone that I can relate to." That said, participants' ability to accurately judge the trustworthiness of advice sources may vary. As an example of good advice, P9 learned to use incognito browsing from a friend, "incognito came out in college and a friend came over and needed to use gmail and just said look at this and logged himself into gmail and didn't need to log me out and it was useful." Similarly, P15 learned about security alarm systems "years ago, from a friend of mine who had a security alarm business." However, P17 mentioned being told less credible information such as the following: "A lot of my friends don't have iPhones because, this is the term they use, 'iPhones are hot'. Like they attract all the attention to your phone, like anything you're doing illegal it can get caught on your phone, 'cause it's like a hot box iPhone. It can be tracked in any type of way, stuff like that. I didn't even know that, I was like whoaaaaa it can be tracked? If I had known that, I wouldn't have gotten an iPhone, yeah." Physical-security advice. As participants are more confident in their ability to evaluate the plausibility of physicalsecurity advice content, for physical security, the advice source is of lesser importance. Only three participants cite the trustworthiness of a physical-advice source as an important metric, and those participants also cited this metric for digital security. Instead, participants rely on their own assessments of physical-security advice to determine whether to implement new behaviors (N=7). On the subject of plausibility, P22 says about physical-security advice, "if it doesn't pass the smell test, in other words if it just doesn't seem plausible, then I dismiss it. If it's something that I recognize as making sense," then he will consider implementing it.
Digital vs. Physical Advice: Usefulness and Trust. Figure 3 shows participants' assessments of the trustworthiness and usefulness of digital-and physical-security advice.
Half of our participants (N=13) felt that physical-security advice was more trustworthy overall than digital-security advice. Only two participants felt that digital-security advice was more trustworthy than physical-security advice. The remaining 10 participants felt that digital-and physical-security advice was equally trustworthy. We suspect that this was largely because, as mentioned above, participants find physical-security advice easier to mentally evaluate (N=7). P9 comments that he would probably trust physical-security advice more than digital-security advice because: "there are a lot fewer variables. I trust it more because it's easier to evaluate if it's legitimate." Similarly, P23 says that she trusts physical-security advice more because it is "more hands on and visual, it's in your face a little bit more."
Relatedly, five participants trust physical-security advice more because they feel it is simpler and easier to implement than digital-security advice. "Physical-security advice is more trustworthy because it's more common sense and they don't typically require you to download and install something that would be trouble in itself," comments P20.
Participants are more split on which advice, digital or physical, is more useful. Nine participants feel that physical advice is more useful, primarily for the same reasons they found physical advice more trustworthy: "I can see the relevance in the personal security whereas the computer security, again I am trusting that because I have a little icon on the right that it is doing its job. Do I know what it it's doing? No." says P7. Similarly, P3 comments that he finds physical-security advice more useful because: "Again, it's my understanding. It just comes so much more naturally."
On the other hand, the 10 participants who feel that digital advice is more useful noted that there are more techniques available for digital than physical security and that they feel a higher risk of digital threats. To the first point, P15 says: "digital-security advice is more useful-because with digital I can probably do more research, and there's more to do there than the physical. Physical you can only do so much, I don't care what I have on me, someone can overpower me." With regard to feeling that there is more digital than physical security risk, P11 comments, "[I] find digital security more useful and more trustworthy because there is so much more research on it and it's so much more pervasive."
D. Why Advice is Rejected
While trustworthiness and plausibility are the two main reasons our participants choose to accept advice, there are a multitude of reasons for which they reject it. Inconvenience is often cited as a possible explanation for users rejecting digitalsecurity advice [6] , [7] , [58] , but it was not the most prevalent reason we discovered. Our participants related frustrations with advice content, such as the content being too marketingoriented, or less surprisingly, too advanced. They also rejected digital-security advice when they believed that they were not at risk or felt that implementing security measures was not their job. Figure 4 summarizes the prevalence of these reasons for rejecting digital-and physical-security advice. Below, we provide further detail on these reasons, and compare and contrast participants' motivations for rejecting advice in each domain.
Too Much Marketing. Eight participants rejected digitaland physical-security advice because it appears to be more about selling a product than about providing advice: "I don't do anything with a price tag attached. I could be persuaded to do it if I had a serious problem. I did have my identity stolen one time but I was able to fix it, but I'm not one of these people who signs up for [identity theft protection] or something like that," says P22. Similarly, P16 wishes that physical-security advice could be more substantive and distributed primarily through mechanisms other than advertisements.
I'm Not At Risk.
Eight participants rejected physicalsecurity advice as unnecessary due to their low risk profile. Four participants rejected digital-security advice for the same reason. P5 says he does not put a password on his phone because, "I just don't feel I have that much interesting stuff on there." P10 comments that she does not use or look for security tactics for her tablet, because "there's nothing personal on the tablet." Similarly, P3 does not take security advice for browsing because he is "not so concerned about browsing as opposed to personal financial information." The participants who cited these feelings for digital security were of varied incomes, and the overall incidence of feelings of "unimportance" around digital security was quite low. This is in contrast to prior work, which had proposed that many users, particularly those with lower incomes, might not execute security behaviors due to low valuation of their data [5] . One possible cause for this change is that as technology becomes more ubiquitous, users are becoming more aware of the value of their data. Overall, feelings that risk was low and therefore implementing a new behavior was unnecessary were more common for physical than digital security.
It's Not My Job. Eighteen participants rely on the companies whose software, hardware, or services they use to keep them safe. These participants do not seem to be making explicit cost-benefit calculations about particular personal behaviors being redundant to the services provided by these companies; rather, they simply assume that they are not responsible for the security of a given system because a corporation they trust is taking care of it. This motivation for rejecting security advice was unique to the digital-security domain. For example, P8 comments, "I had been banking with a bank that I wasn't happy with. Then I went to Bank of America, which was this big bank. I'm like, 'Oh, they're awesome so I don't have to worry about anything. I will be safe.'"
In addition to trusting corporations to take care of security for them, participants also rely on browser and device prompts (N=20), software defaults (N=20) and security requirements imposed by their services (e.g., your password must be 16 characters long) (N=14) to keep them safe. For example, many participants use a password or passcode to lock their phone because the phone prompted them to do so at set-up. P2 says, "When you boot up these phones now, they just give you the option." Relatedly, P4 says she only has passwords or passcodes on her Mac products because, "the Mac products prompt you to set up the security things...I never thought about it [for the Kindle]. I guess it wasn't prompted...I would have to look up, how to do it on the Kindle." In addition to prompts, participants rely on software defaults, such as those in antivirus software, to provide security tactics: P17 comments, that she has a script and popup blocker because it "was through Other reasons for rejecting advice.
Nine participants stated that they felt oversaturated and lacked the time to implement the advice they saw, even if they thought it was good advice. P7 says: "Part of it is just saturation. You get so much information from so many sources. I don't even know sometimes what's worth looking at." Additionally, P6 notes that in general he often does not take security advice because he has "kind of reached a level of don't care. It's so obvious to me that I don't know what I don't know, that it's frustrating to try to tease apart what would be helpful and what wouldn't."
The advice may also be too advanced (N=7), too inconvenient (N=6), or participants may feel that no matter what, they will be hacked (N=11). Even participants who are highly educated may reject digital-security advice for being too advanced (N=4). P9 holds a computer engineering degree and says he knows that HTTPS and SSL exist, but "I don't even know what the acronyms mean, I know that some websites are more secure and others aren't, and I don't pay attention to it." P8, who holds a master's degree, also struggles to understand too-complex advice: she sometimes rejects advice, "Depending on the number of steps and the complexity of it because I'm not a IT person . . . it can be complex what they're asking me to do."
Finally, a few participants described reasoning that was less common but still interesting, with possible implications for design. One participant (P3) noted that he rejects advice because he see it in the wrong venue: "I see the information while on [public transit] to work and then by the end of the day, looking at a computer is the last thing I want to do." We hypothesize that this factor may be important for many users, even though no other participants explicitly mentioned it. A few other participants reported rejecting what they perceived as good advice for others because they were already confident in their own behaviors (N=3). P25 notes that having others tell him how to be digitally secure is pointless, because: "I do what I do based on my own personal feelings and intellect, so I don't find it useful, but for someone who didn't know it would be useful. Never found any of the advice useful. I just have my own way of protecting what I do, so it's like if someone's telling you how to make a PB&J sandwich, and I'm like I know how to do it. But if they're saying something drastic-don't do this, this, and this-then I'll look at it, but usually, no."
E. Security-Sensitive vs. General Participants
In addition to differences between participants' behavior in the physical-and digital-security domains, we also noted possible differences between participants in our sample who are and are not security-sensitive. We recruited securitysensitive participants to investigate how extra training in handling confidential or sensitive data at work would affect how participants process security advice in their personal lives. Below, we discuss some observed trends that appear to differentiate security-sensitive from general participants; given our qualitative data and limited sample size, these findings mainly serve to suggest directions for further exploration. The prevalence of these differences in our sample is summarized in Figure 5 .
Two-Factor Authentication. Seven of 15 security-sensitive participants in our study had adopted two-factor authentication (2FA), compared to eight of 10 general participants. Four of these security-sensitive participants cite privacy concerns as a reason for not using 2FA. Thus, we hypothesize that security-sensitive users may be less trusting that the service requesting 2FA can protect their personal information. Participants' motivations for accepting and rejecting two-factor authentication are discussed in more detail in Section IV-F. This potential difference between the privacy concerns of security-sensitive and general users should be confirmed with additional quantitative investigation, as discussed in Section V.
Advice Evaluation. Nine of 15 security-sensitive participants cited the trustworthiness of the advice source as their key metric for choosing to take digital-security advice, compared to only two of 10 general participants. We suspect that security-sensitive users may be more discerning about advice because they have been trained to look critically at the digital information they come across. A primary component of workplace digital-security training is reminders not to trust unknown individuals [59] , [60] .
Workplace Digital-Security Advice. Thirteen out of 15 security-sensitive participants took advice from their workplace, contrasted with four of 10 regular participants. This is perhaps unsurprising given the workplace emphasis on digitalsecurity and regular trainings that occur for security-sensitive users.
Beliefs About the Utility Digital Security Advice. Eight of 15 security-sensitive participants in our sample believed that digital-security advice was more useful than physical security advice, compared to two of 10 general participants. We speculate this may be related to these participants being more frequently reminded to pay attention to digital security and data sensitivity.
Feelings of Inevitability. General participants in our sample expressed more feelings of inevitability ('no matter what, I will be hacked') than did security-sensitive participants. Six out of 10 general participants expressed these feelings, contrasted with three out of 15 security sensitive participants. We hypothesize that less formal training may contribute to general users having more feelings of powerlessness.
F. Case Study: Two-factor Authentication
As mentioned in Section II-B, Ion et al. report that use of two-factor authentication (2FA) is one of the top three security behaviors recommended by or used by security experts. However, only 40% of the non-expert participants in that study reported using 2FA. Our results shed some light on the reasoning behind users' acceptance or rejection of this behavior.
How and Why I Use Two-Factor Authentication. Of the participants we interviewed, more than half reported using 2FA (N=14). In our interview questions about 2FA, we started by defining 2FA as "a service where you might put in your phone number and then be sent a verification code." Given this definition, all participants recognized 2FA and were able to substantively answer our interview questions on this topic. Of our 14 participants who had used 2FA, five used 2FA for some, but not all, services for which it is offered. These participants use 2FA for those services they feel are particularly important: P6 says, "I've got 2FA on one thing, and that is my insurance company. I did that because [of a negative experience at my workplace]. I figured that [my insurance] was one of the most important things, because...it covers every aspect in my life. I didn't want anyone to mess with that."
Alternately, participants may only use 2FA on services that strongly encourage or force them to do so: "I do that with Xbox Live, they force me to do that. I think Google, they want me to do that but I always say later," comments P12. 1 Similarly, P14 says: "Yes, at one time Verizon, because I have a Verizon email account, it asked me to do [2FA], it takes a while but I've done it...it forced me to do it." Of the remaining nine participants who used 2FA, two did not understand what they were doing: P16 comments, "You mean when it asks to use by text or phone call? I do that, even though I hate doing it, because I'm trying to figure out what is the purpose, but it says the purpose is your safety and security." Why I Don't Use Two-Factor Authentication.
Eleven participants knew about but chose not to use 2FA. Five of these participants declined 2FA due to privacy concerns: specifically, they worried about giving out their personal phone number, about GPS tracking based on that phone number, and about the service providing 2FA's ability to keep their information secure. For example, P13 says: "No, [I want] nothing connected to the phone. So, the phone is directly connected to the email. I don't feel comfortable to let people in if it's connected to the email account." Similarly, P3 says: "I think I do have that [2FA] capacity. I think I've always declined Gmail enabling that access...Based on what I know about Gmail, it just seemed like giving up too much information to Google." With regard to protecting the information used for verification, P23 says: "Google has prompted but I've always ignored it because I think that someone will get ahold of it, I'm not saying they would, but I'm just always like, you know, yeah."
In addition to privacy concerns, two participants declined to use 2FA due to convenience concerns: "Two years ago, at the beginning of the summer, Google introduced 2FA, and this was an issue because I tried to log in and I didn't get cell service and I couldn't get the text message to log in, and that was the last time I tried to change anything," says P9. And 1 Note that XBox Live does not require two-factor authentication, but this participant may have misinterpreted the prompt screen as a requirement. two participants declined the service due to not understanding the purpose of the tool.
V. DESIGN GUIDELINES
In the following section, we make a number of design suggestions and recommendations for future work. While our data suggests support for these design suggestions, our results are qualitative and so have limited generalizability, thus future research is recommended to confirm the efficacy and necessity of these designs.
Develop Vignettes to Simulate Negative Security Experiences.
As shown both in our results and in Rader et al.'s work, negative events experienced by users or their friends can be key motivators for security behavior change [3] . However, we would prefer that users do not undergo these negative experiences. Moreover, even if the cost of a negative security event was worth the skills the user learned, there are few ways to artificially create these negative security experiences without stressing or harming users.
Our findings highlight a potential solution to this problem-mini-clips, training videos, or other media designed to artificially create a salient negative-security experience. We found evidence in our sample that mimicking negative events via a well-crafted fictional narrative with relatable characters can be very effective. We believe that this idea has merit, as stories can be "a very powerful way to represent and convey complex, multi-dimensional ideas" and the efficacy of using fictional vignettes to improve behavior has been proven in the organizational development and health-behavior change fields [61] , [62] .
Our findings suggest three elements that may be important to the efficacy of such vignettes: creating relatable characters, demonstrating clear causes for negative security events; and ensuring that characters who fix security problems appear trustworthy. Findings from prior work in the entertainmenteducation field, primarily around health behavior change, can help inform the creation of relatable characters [63] , [64] . However, further research, which will likely draw upon work in the communications, psychology and education fields, is required to determine how to create relatable characters and trustworthy advisors. Many of our participants considered IT professionals and "tech-savvy" individuals amongst their friends and family to be trustworthy advice sources. Prior work on technology help seeking suggests a number of attributes common to those who are asked or observed for technology advice [65] , [66] . However, a deeper investigation is needed to determine what will lead users to trust a character portrayed in a vignette as an authoritative source of digital-security advice.
Further evaluation of what makes a piece of media trustworthy will be required in order to a) pursue this design and b) generally indicate trustworthiness for other security advice distributed via the media. This evaluation may include drawing upon measures of credibility developed in the mass communications and marketing fields [67] , [68] .
Avoid the Perception of Marketing. We found that users reject security advice that contains marketing material; therefore, advice that suggests or encourages purchasing a particular product or service (especially if associated with the advice source) reduces credibility and should therefore be avoided. Further, designing digital-security advice that clearly states the author's qualifications-for example "John Smith, Senior Security Engineer at Google," may increase advice credibility and authenticity.
Reassure Users About Privacy. Both 2FA and password managers appear in the top six expert-recommended digital security behaviors [8] ; our results suggest that privacy concerns and misunderstandings are at least partially driving low adoption of each technique. For example, with regard to password managers, P7 notes that she does not like "the notion of a machine memorizing my password, I don't know where it's going, I don't know who has it and I don't know what is happening with it." For 2FA, we hypothesize that users may be prioritizing the immediate risk of sharing private information (e.g. phone number) over the long-term risk of compromising a service (e.g. email). This is an example of present bias, our tendency to prioritize immediate rewards or concerns over long-term gains [69] .
Thus, our third recommendation is to clearly explain to users (and not just in a privacy policy that no users will read) how their personal data, such as a phone number for 2FA or passwords for a password manager, will be protected. Mitigating these privacy concerns could provide high-impact benefits for users.
Explore the Effect of Security Sensitivity.
Our results suggest possible differences between security-sensitive and general users, such as higher importance placed on digital security, fewer feelings of inevitability, and higher reliance on the workplace as a source of digital-security advice. Given our small sample size, we were not able to report the general prevalence of these differences and whether these differences result in meaningfully better security behavior. The behavioral impact of workplace security training and sensitive data exposure is an important avenue for future exploration.
Distribute Advice Via Pre-existing Channels. Many of our participants trust hardware and software companies to keep them secure without additional intervention; other participants valued direct advice from those companies. Thus, corporations such as Google, Apple, Facebook and Comcast are well positioned to make a large impact on users' digital security, as already-trusted sources of perceived credible advice. However, our results suggest that it may be crucial for these corporations to make it clear that they are the source of the advice and to avoid the perception of marketing so that users can easily recognize the credibility of their information.
We also found that participants rely on IT professionals, particularly those from their workplaces, as a source of credible digital-security advice, even for personal technology. Given that many IT professionals are already overloaded with requests, we suggest organizations plan to provide them with extra support and training for this potentially critical but underacknowledged role. Training IT professionals to distribute a small set of valuable advice as an explicit part of their job duties could have a strong positive impact on users' security behavior. Investigating the feasibility and efficacy of this approach is a rich topic for future work.
VI. SUMMARY
Users must sift through a multitude of security advice to determine which security behaviors to implement and which to reject. This process of evaluating security tactics based on the advice of others is multi-faceted and complex. In an effort to understand users' choices, we conducted a semi-structured interview study of 25 participants with varied demographics and security sensitivities. We asked questions about users' security behaviors, how they learned these behaviors, and why they accepted or rejected different behaviors and pieces of advice. Our analysis of these interviews resulted in three key findings.
First, our findings indicate that users believe they lack the skills to evaluate the content of digital-security advice and must instead rely on their evaluation of the trustworthiness of the advice source when determining whether to accept the advice. Sources they trust include their workplace, providers of their digital services, IT professionals, family members, and friends. Our participants also relied upon media as a source of advice, but only if it passed an heuristic credibility test.
Second, we found that users reject security advice for a number of somewhat surprising reasons, including containing too much marketing information and threatening users' sense of privacy. Further, a majority of participants believed that someone or something else was responsible for their security in at least one digital domain (e.g., online banking).
Third, we found evidence that vignettes of negative experiences in TV shows or movies may be able to change behavior in a similar manager to negative experiences that are directly experienced. Thus, through further research testing the efficacy of fictional negative-event vignettes in securitybehavior change, we may be able to develop a novel, highlyeffective intervention. • Where do you tend to walk?
VII. APPENDIX

A. Questions
Employment
-Do you walk more than 10 minutes a day?
• Are there any particular approaches you take, or items you carry, when walking alone? • Have you had any martial arts/self defense training?
-Why did you undergo this training? Who administered the training?
• Why do you use these strategies? For each strategy, ask: -When did you start using this strategy? -How do you feel that this strategy works to protect you? -Why did you choose to use this strategy over using a different one? -What are you most worried about? -Have you ever had a negative experience? -Do you know anyone who has had a negative experience? -Are there ever times when you do not choose to use this strategy? -Where or from whom did you learn this strategy?
• Are there strategies you have considered or heard about but do not use? 
